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Der 64-jährige General Khin Nyunt wird von politischen Beobachtern in Rangun als "moderater Reformer" eingestuft. Seine Ernennung zum Premier könnte sich eher günstig auf das Verhältnis zwischen dem Regime und der unterdrückten Demokratiebewegung auswirken, meinten asiatische Diplomaten am Dienstag in der burmesischen Hauptstadt. Khin Nyunt war auch bisher die "Nummer drei" nach Than Shwe und dessen Stellvertreter Maung Aye, der vergangene Woche nach Peking gereist war. Maung Aye steht an der Spitze einer einflussreichen Junta-Fraktion, die sich allen Liberalisierungstendenzen energisch widersetzt und der enge Kontakte zur chinesischen Führung nachgesagt werden.

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Can you tell us about your experiences dealing with censorship in Burma?

Tin Maung Than: In my career, sometimes I succeeded and other times I failed in dealing with censorship. By succeeding, I mean that I was able get past the censors and at the same time get my message across to my readers. But sometimes readers didn’t understand what I meant. Other times, I couldn’t cross the [censorship] line at all. So I would call theses cases my failures. It happened that way sometimes.

Dealing with the censor, you have to be very tactful. Sometimes we have to change the presentation style. From the Western point of view, some of our articles are too long. But we have to make them long because it is sometimes necessary to have some cover-up. There are always two messages, [one on] the surface and [another] underneath. When you read the article, you can find the surface message and then go to the underneath message.

In the past few years, there has been an explosion of journalism in Burma. Some say that the atmosphere for intellectual creativity has improved, but at the same time, you still have censorship. Do you see any kind of contradiction in these two trends?

Tin Maung Than: I think there is no change, specifically [with regard to] tolerance of dissenting views. But in my experience, the regime can tolerate it to a certain extent if we are talking about economic or development policy. But they would never tolerate any political discussion. Every time we get into that area, we get censored. In a way, [there has been some] improvement. But overall, I don’t think there is any real relaxation.

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To what extent does the junta react to the international media? Who monitors the media?

Tin Maung Than: I think the international media has a very important role in influencing policy. For example, the government allowed a recent issue of Time magazine, in which they made a box on Aids in Burma, to enter the country. They tolerated the criticisms. I think that they consider [foreign news reports] when formulating policies. Not the top brass, but high-ranking officers who have to report to the generals. This link is very important. The high-ranking officers who are close to the decision-makers read every piece of work. And they have to acknowledge the international perception. You cannot get immediate results, but it has a long-range effect. But even high-ranking officers have limitations. They try to persuade their bosses to change policy, but the system is rigid.

What about the media’s analysis of splits in the leadership? What kind of impact does this have?

Tin Maung Than: Here you have a classic response. They will pretend that they are united. Maybe for six months or one year they will have unity. There is policy conflict between military supremacy and development. One group represents supremacy and the other development. This is why you have ceasefire agreements with minority groups--because one side is oriented towards development.

Can you be more specific? For example, how does this apply to the Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt factions?

Tin Maung Than: I won’t comment on people. When you focus on a person, at the same time you are restricted from their thinking. You are attached to that person and you focus on that person; this is what happens in politics. I would rather be detached from the person and focus more on the policies and ideas. I assume that apart from the Khin Nyunt faction there are [other moderate] groups. If you are limited to Khin Nyunt, then when Khin Nyunt is kicked out, you have no choice but to become more responsive to the hardliners. That is a very grave danger in our thinking. I would rather focus on the assumption that there are various moderate forces.

Dass der ehemalige Postangestellte eines Tages nicht mehr da sein wird, ist das einzig Positive, das von ihm zu erwarten ist. Mit Einschränkungen gilt das auch für seine engsten Mitstreiter. Die Nummer zwei der Junta ist 65, die Nummer drei 67 Jahre alt. Alle haben Angst vor einem Systemwechsel - aus purem Egoismus. Unter anderem haben sie Sorge, dass sie für ihre Verbrechen zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden könnten. Die charismatische Oppositionsführerin Aung San Suu Kyi hat ihnen Amnestie versprochen, aber ihr vertrauen die Militärmachthaber nicht.

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Nur Suu Kyi könnte das Land friedlich in einem föderalen System einen, allerdings hat das vor ihr niemand geschafft. Sie braucht die passive Unterstützung der Soldaten, massive Hilfe aus dem Ausland und das Wohlwollen der Minderheiten, auf die sie zugehen muss.

Reasons Not to Go

• International tourism can be seen to give a stamp of approval to the SPDC
• Aung San Suu Kyi (mehr) and the NLD have called on the international community to boycott travel to Myanmar until the candidates elected in 1990 are allowed to form a government
• The government keeps travellers away from areas where forced labour or repression of minorities is occurring
• It is difficult to avoid some government-owned businesses, tourism sites and transport, and impossible to avoid the mandatory purchase of US$200 worth of FECs
• Forced labour has been used to construct some of the country's tourism infrastructure

Reasons to Go

• Tourism remains one of the few industries to which ordinary Burmese have access. Any reduction in tourism means a reduction in local income-earning opportunities
• It is becoming increasingly possible to travel in Myanmar without staying in government-owned hotels, using government-owned transport etc
• Many pro-democracy activists within Myanmar itself argue that sanctions are counter-productive, and that economic development can lead to political liberalisation
• Keeping the Burmese isolated from international witnesses to internal oppression may only cement the government's control

If You Decide to Go

In order to maximise the positive effects of a visit among the general populace, while minimising support of the government, follow these simple tactics:

• Stay at private, locally owned hotels and guesthouses Avoid package tours connected with Myanmar Travel & Tours
• Avoid MTT-sponsored modes of transport, such as the Yangon-Mandalay Express trains, the MTT ferry between Mandalay and Bagan, and Myanma Airways (MA) flights
• Buy handicrafts directly from the artisans, rather than from government shops
• Avoid patronising companies involved with the military-owned Myanmar Economic Holdings. Companies with solid links to the Tatmadaw (armed forces) are often called Myawadi or Myawaddy
• Write to the Myanmar government and to the Myanmar embassy in your country expressing your views about the human-rights situation there

(Quelle)