Can you tell us about your experiences dealing with censorship in Burma?

Tin Maung Than: In my career, sometimes I succeeded and other times I failed in dealing with censorship. By succeeding, I mean that I was able get past the censors and at the same time get my message across to my readers. But sometimes readers didn’t understand what I meant. Other times, I couldn’t cross the [censorship] line at all. So I would call theses cases my failures. It happened that way sometimes.

Dealing with the censor, you have to be very tactful. Sometimes we have to change the presentation style. From the Western point of view, some of our articles are too long. But we have to make them long because it is sometimes necessary to have some cover-up. There are always two messages, [one on] the surface and [another] underneath. When you read the article, you can find the surface message and then go to the underneath message.

In the past few years, there has been an explosion of journalism in Burma. Some say that the atmosphere for intellectual creativity has improved, but at the same time, you still have censorship. Do you see any kind of contradiction in these two trends?

Tin Maung Than: I think there is no change, specifically [with regard to] tolerance of dissenting views. But in my experience, the regime can tolerate it to a certain extent if we are talking about economic or development policy. But they would never tolerate any political discussion. Every time we get into that area, we get censored. In a way, [there has been some] improvement. But overall, I don’t think there is any real relaxation.

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To what extent does the junta react to the international media? Who monitors the media?

Tin Maung Than: I think the international media has a very important role in influencing policy. For example, the government allowed a recent issue of Time magazine, in which they made a box on Aids in Burma, to enter the country. They tolerated the criticisms. I think that they consider [foreign news reports] when formulating policies. Not the top brass, but high-ranking officers who have to report to the generals. This link is very important. The high-ranking officers who are close to the decision-makers read every piece of work. And they have to acknowledge the international perception. You cannot get immediate results, but it has a long-range effect. But even high-ranking officers have limitations. They try to persuade their bosses to change policy, but the system is rigid.

What about the media’s analysis of splits in the leadership? What kind of impact does this have?

Tin Maung Than: Here you have a classic response. They will pretend that they are united. Maybe for six months or one year they will have unity. There is policy conflict between military supremacy and development. One group represents supremacy and the other development. This is why you have ceasefire agreements with minority groups--because one side is oriented towards development.

Can you be more specific? For example, how does this apply to the Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt factions?

Tin Maung Than: I won’t comment on people. When you focus on a person, at the same time you are restricted from their thinking. You are attached to that person and you focus on that person; this is what happens in politics. I would rather be detached from the person and focus more on the policies and ideas. I assume that apart from the Khin Nyunt faction there are [other moderate] groups. If you are limited to Khin Nyunt, then when Khin Nyunt is kicked out, you have no choice but to become more responsive to the hardliners. That is a very grave danger in our thinking. I would rather focus on the assumption that there are various moderate forces.